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THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES IN THE NEW
PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE: A NEW
CONCEPT IN PROPERTY OFFENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvania's new Crimes Code' incorporates a new concept
into the area of property offenses in Pennsylvania in a chapter
entitled "Theft and Related Offenses."'2 Whereas the Penal Code
of 19398 covered individual offenses such as larceny, embezzlement,
false pretenses, and blackmail in both common law and statu-
tory terms, the new Crimes Code condenses these and numerous
other individual offenses into several key categories. In addition,
the common law and old statutory definitions have been abandoned
in favor of codified definitions, stated in those categories, which
both broaden and clarify the scope of the respective offenses. The
result of this recodification and redefinition is that old terms such
as "larceny" and "embezzlement" are no longer able to accurately
describe property offenses which the new code refers to as "theft."
For example, what was "larceny" under the old law must now be
thought of as "theft," an old term but a new concept, defined in
the appropriate sections of the new code.4 The name is different
and the elements are different from those of the old law, and al-
though those differences may be minimal in some cases, the new
statutory section must be totally reevaluated and approached as a
new concept termed "theft." This Comment will review briefly the
elements of the old property offenses which have been assimilated
into the "theft" chapter of the new code and analyze those elements
in terms of the new Crimes Code. Emphasis will be placed upon
those offenses which have been greatly affected by the change,
while those areas which have remained essentially untouched will
be mentioned only briefly.
1. PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 18 (Supp. 1973).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973). Although this arti-
cle is limited to Chapter 39 of the new code, Chapter 39 must be considered
in conjunction with Chapter 41: "Forgery and Fraudulent Practices."
Both of these chapters are basic to the area of property offenses and com-
plementary unto each other. For a complete comprehension of theft of-
fenses, Chapter 41 must also be considered.
3. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 1 et seq., [1939] Pa. Laws 872
(repealed 1973).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3921 (Supp. 1973).
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II. TH EVOLUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA'S NEw "THEFT" OFFENSES
In 1939 Pennsylvania developed its first penal code.5 This
code was merely a collection of various criminal statutes organized
and presented in an orderly fashion to facilitate the administration
of the laws which already existed. Although the existing laws
were effectively categorized into appropriate sections, the prob-
lems of surplusage and definitive ambiguity remained. These
problems were particularly evident in the area of offenses against
property. In referring to the old law, the commentary to the new
code states:
Formerly, Pennsylvania had a hodgepodge of six black-
mail sections, eight larceny sections, and fourteen sections
on embezzlement and taking by fraud. Because most of
these laws were enacted piecemeal, with little regard for
existing statutes, one was bewildered with the attempts to
make sense out of the needlessly frustrating overlap, the
chaos primarily resulting from common law interpretations
and the lack of correlation between punishment compared
to the type of unlawful taking and amount taken.6
The "frustrating overlap" was noticeable, for example, in the area
of blackmail. In one section, the 1939 code made it criminal to "ex-
tort" money by written, printed, or oral communication, 7 and in
the next section became more specific by indicating that it was
blackmail to intimidate and extort money by threat of "injury to
reputation or business."8  Such duplication was unnecessary. In
addition to the overlap, few terms or offenses in the old code were
carefully defined and many offenses were merely defined in com-
mon law terms. For example, the larceny provision simply stated
that "[W]hoever commits larceny, is guilty of a felony"; 9 defini-
tive guidance was to be found only in the common law. This fail-
ure to define, edit, and categorize the various types of offenses
with any type of precision made it imperative to seek a workable
recodification, especially in light of the increasing volume of
criminal offenses'0 and the necessity of facilitating criminal ad-
ministration.
5. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 1 et seq., [1939] Pa. Laws 872
(repealed 1973).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, Comments viii (1972). See also 38 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 120, 135 (1966).
7. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 801, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
8. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 802, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
9. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 807, [1939] Pa. Laws 873 (repealed
1973).
10. According to a 1969 Pennsylvania Task Force Report, the prop-
In recent years, especially since the American Law Institute
proposed its official draft of the Model Penal Code" in 1962, the
trend in the United States has been toward wholly statutory
crimes codes. 12 In the states adopting a statutory scheme, new
statutory definitions have replaced the common law as the founda-
tion of the crimes code.13 Although some problems exist in
these new codes, the result has been ameliorative with a clearer
and more definitive structure. Several of these new codes 14 have
been patterned almost exclusively on the Model Penal Code. Such
is the case with Pennsylvania's new Crimes Code, especially in re-
gard to "theft" offenses. When the Model Penal Code was re-
leased in 1962, an early proponent of a new crimes code in Penn-
sylvania noted:
[T]he Model Penal Code urges much and our present
penal code wants much . . . . The Model Penal Code has
gone from the past to the present in theft and related of-
fenses. It is simple. There is one crime-theft, and under
the general accusation of theft are included all the forty or
so offenses in Pennsylvania. Multiple prosecutions to make
the evidence fit the appropriate offense could and should
be done away with.15
This advice was apparently heeded because the new Pennsylvania
Crimes Code is built largely upon the foundation supplied by the
Model Penal Code.
16
III. CONSOLIDATION AND GRADING UNDER THE NEW CODE
A. Consolidation
Under Pennsylvania's new Crimes Code all of the offenses
termed "Theft" in Chapter 39 constitute a single offense. 17 The
erty crimes of burglary, larceny, theft of $50 or more, and auto theft com-
prised 88% of the index crime offenses within Pennsylvania for 1967.
Pennsylvania Crime Commission, Task Force Report: Assessment of Crime
and Criminal Justice in Pennsylvania 12 (January 1969).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.01 (Prop. Official Draft 1962).
12. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-01 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1 (West 1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0 (Prop. Official Draft 1962);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.01 (1958).
13. See,e.g., ARIz REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-01 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 6 (West 1972); WIS STAT. ANN. § 939.10 (1958).
14. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. 15, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 10-3030 (Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 164.005-164.135 (Supp.
1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.20 (1958).
15. Sloane A Touch Upon the Model Penal Code and Pennsylvania
Criminal Law, 35 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 359, 364 (1963-64).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1973) which says:
Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single
offense. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that
it was committed in any manner that would be theft under this
chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in
the complaint or indictment, subject only to the power of the court
to ensure fair trial by granting a continuance or other appropr-
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draftsmen of the Model Penal Code and the Pennsylvania Code
believed that such a unification was necessary for two reasons:
(1) to facilitate the drafting of defenses applicable to all forms of
theft and of rational punishment provisions graded according to
the amount of property or other meaningful aspects of the offense,
and (2) to eliminate pointless procedural obstacles for thieves
and swindlers.' 8 Both reasons are based on organizational and
procedural rationale which are founded upon the unifying term
"theft."
"Theft" is not the name of any common law offense. Profes-
sor Perkins has noted that it is usually "broader" than the term
larceny,' 9 and a federal court has said:
The word "theft" is not like "larceny," a technical word of
art with a narrowly defined meaning but is on the con-
trary, a word of general and broad connotation, intended
to cover and covering any criminal appropriation of an-
other's property to the use of the taker, particularly in-
cluding theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other
form of guile.20
The wide latitude of offenses that "theft" connotes makes it an
excellent term to describe the character and class of offenses in-
tended to be embodied in the new code,21 including such common
law and statutory terms as larceny, blackmail, extortion, embezzle-
ment, fraudulent conversion, false pretenses, receiving stolen goods,
and shoplifting.2 2  Yet the new concept of theft can no longer be
ate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced
by lack of fair notice or by surprise.
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
See also, Sloane and Maxwell, Pennsylvania Bar Association Report of
Committee on Criminal Law Recodification and the Model Penal Code, 39
PA. B. Ass'N Q. 146, 153 (1963), where the authors "strongly endorse" the
Model Penal Code's approach to consolidation.
19. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 320 (2d ed. 1969).
20. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956). See
also People v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213, 81 N.E.2d 817 (1943).
21. Some penal codes used the word "larceny" for similar purposes.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL § 155.00 (McKinney 1965). But see R. PERKINS,
PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 319 (2d ed. 1969), where the author notes
that the term "larceny" has a disadvantage in that it frequently becomes
necessary to add a modifier to make clear whether the reference is to
common law larceny or to statutory larceny.
22. "Shoplifting," termed "retail theft" in the new code (PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 3929 (Supp. 1973) ), is not covered in the text of this Com-
ment. It is patterned on retail theft legislation proposed by the Pennsyl-
vania Retailer's Association (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3929, Comment 21
(1972) ), but the changes have been few (see Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375,
§ 816.1, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973)), except for the penalty
which has been increased from a maximum of ninety days imprisonment
defined by the old terms because it has a new meaning unto itself.
Theft is not the product of a conglomeration of common law and
old statutory terms, but rather a term defined and illustrated within
the bounds of Chapter 39 of the new Crimes Code.
This new concept can first be witnessed in the procedural
consequences of the consolidation. The code says, "An accusa-
tion of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed
in any manner that would be theft under this chapter, notwith-
standing the specification of a different manner in the complaint
or indictment. '23 For instance, if the complaint charges that the
defendant committed theft by "unlawful taking and disposition"
and it is found during the trial that the theft was, in fact "by
receiving stolen goods," another trial will not be necessary since
the defendant was found guilty of "theft," a single offense regard-
less of the manner in which it was accomplished. 24  Of course,
without any safeguards this simple procedure would easily preju-
dice the defendant if a prosecutor were to charge some form of
"theft" and then hope the proof offered would narrow the of-
fense. To avoid this problem, the code provides a check on possible
abuse of the consolidation by making the consolidation's proce-
dural effects subject to "the power of the court to ensure fair trial
by granting a continuance or other appropriate relief where
the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair
notice or by surprise."25  Prosecutors must still be careful to
charge the correct offense and the correct manner in which it
was committed under the new code in order to avoid surprise to
the defendant and a resulting multiplicity of prosecutions. Yet
this rule places no real burden on the prosecution since the of-
fenses within the "theft" chapter are clearly distinguishable
26
and prosecutors will be able to place each offense in the correct
category. The only difficulty and uncertainty in the consolidation
is the possible trouble that the courts may have in determining
whether the defendant has been prejudiced by lack of fair notice
or surprise. (But this problem appears to be minimal and results
from the necessity of ensuring a fair trial).
The "consolidation" forms the basis of the code's new ap-
to a maximum of five years for third and subsequent offenders. (PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3929(a) (3) (Supp. 1973) ). The increased penalty
seems to be aimed at decreasing recidivism, while at the same time put-
ting emphasis on property protection rather than the pettiness of the
offense.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1973). It has been noted
that "this consolidation simplifies the statement of the law. It also re-
lieves the prosecution, courts, and juries of the necessity of making techni-
cal distinctions between different kinds of stealing." Schwartz, The Model
Penal Code: An Invitation to Law Reform, 49 A.B.A.J. 447, 453 (1963).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1973).
25. Id.




proach to property offenses. Its effect has been to define with
more precision and conciseness the elements of various offenses
and the limits of their expanded scope. It should facilitate the ad-
ministration of justice while restricting procedural abuses of
defendants. Moreover, the consolidation of theft offenses indi-
cates that this area is a new concept in property offenses, and that,
therefore, theft must be approached as an integral totality in or-
der to be comprehended and utilized effectively.
7
B. Grading2"
Since one of the purposes of the consolidation is to facilitate
the drafting of punishment provisions, 29 consolidation has a direct
bearing on grading the offenses under the new code. As a result,
the grading of theft offenses is simplified since it is generally based
upon the amount involved in the theft offense.30 For example, the
theft of more than fifty dollars but less than two hundred dollars
is a second degree misdemeanor, whereas theft of fifty dollars
or less is a third degree misdemeanor. 3 1
To a large degree, the new system of grading is a reaction to
prior law, under which the amount of the theft had no bearing
on the punishment imposed.3 2 Larceny is a prime example. Un-
der the old penal code, the stealing of an apple from an outside
fruit stand was a felony punishable by a maximum $2000 fine and
five years imprisonment; and stealing an apple from a tree was a
misdemeanor and punishable by a maximum $2000 fine and three
years imprisonment; and stealing an apple by shoplifting was a
summary offense punishable by a maximum $50 fine and ninety
days imprisonment.3 3 Incredibly, it did not matter whether the
subject matter was one apple or a truckload of apples-the penalty
was the same. 34
27. See PA. R. CRrm. P. 220, which allows an indictment to be
amended in certain circumstances and should be considered along with
the consolidation aspect of the new Crimes Code.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3903 (Supp. 1973).
29. See note 18 and accompanying text supTa.
30. PA. STAT. ANm. tit. 18, § 3903, Comment 20 (1972).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 106(b) (Supp. 1973). See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 106 (Supp. 1973), for a classification of the offenses and
the corresponding penalties. "Retail theft" is unique here, in that it pro-
vides its own system of grading. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3929
(Supp. 1973). This seems to be based on the fact that the offense is less
unconscionable than other types of theft, although penalties for repeaters
can be up to five years imprisonment. Id.
32. See,e.g., Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 807, [1939] Pa. Laws 872
(repealed 1973).
33. Kessler, An Indictment of the Pennsylvania Penal Code, 29 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 311, 320-21 (June 1958).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3903, Comment 20 (1972).
The new Crimes Code bases its grading system entirely upon
the value of the property appropriated. 5  This change is not
surprising since all of the offenses in the new code are directly
related to "value," an integral part of the definition of the
subject matter of theft (i.e., "property" 36 ). Although the com-
mentators of the new code defend this method of grading, their
defense is negative. They state that "[W]hile it is agreed that
the amount of the theft does not provide an infallible indication
of how dangerous the offender is, it is at least a rough measurement
of the injury."' 7 But it is questionable whether this "rough meas-
urement" is as effective as it could be, While striving for sim-
plicity, the new code seems to ignore the realities of such situations
as, for example, "theft by extortion" 3 where the threat could be
one of bodily injury or a threat to subject a person to hatred.
Obviously, the former threat is a graver offense than the latter
one, but under the new code the penalty would merely depend on
the value of the money extorted. Since the draftsmen of the
code provided lesser special penalties for "retail theft,' 39 it seems
feasible that they could have provided special penalties where the
inherent qualities of the offense demanded them without sacrific-
ing too much simplicity or any clarity.40
Aside from its few shortcomings, the grading provisions of
the theft chapter have taken a large step away from feudal inter-
pretations and penalties. The draftsmen have reevaluated the
old law logically and realisitically as far as they have gone. But
it is submitted that "value" is not the only criterion on which
to base penalties for theft. Other criteria, such as the gravity
and severity of the offense, should be incorporated into the penal
theory regarding theft, in order that the reevaluation of the old
law may be complete.
IV. "THEFT": NEW OFFENSES UNDER THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMES CODE
A. Theft by Unlawful Taking and Disposition
This section encompasses the majority of former theft-type
offenses specified by the 1939 Penal Code, including all of the of-
fenses termed larceny, embezzlement, and fraudulent conversion.
In effect, the distinctions between the crimes under prior law
were negligible; 41 therefore, they have been assimilated into one
35. Id.
36. See note 67 and accompanying text infra.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3903, Comment 20 (1972).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923 (Supp. 1973).
39. See note 31 supra.
40. See Rubin, Sentencing and Correctional Treatment Under the Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, 46 A.B.A.J. 994 (1960), for a criticism of
criminal penalties under the Model Penal Code.
41. R. PErKiNs, PERKINS ON CpImINAL LAw 319 (2d ed. 1969).
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offense. This section of the Comment will present a brief resum6
of the former offenses of larcency, embezzlement, and fraudulent
conversion and then offer a statement of the corresponding of-
fense under the new code. It should be noted that terms such as
"larceny" are not used in the new law which is conceptually dif-
ferent than the old law, and that the old law is purely historical
except to clarify points upon which the new code is vague.
(1) The Old Offenses of Larceny, Embezzlement,
and Fraudulent Conversion
(a) Larceny
Larceny in Pennsylvania was essentially common law lar-
ceny 42 since nowhere in the old penal code was larceny defined.
43
The 1939 code said simply that "[W]hoever commits larceny is
guilty of felony. '44 Therefore, courts had to look to the common
law which said that larceny consisted of five elements: 45 (1) The
subject matter must have been tangible and valuable personal
property; (2) The property must have been of another; (3) There
must have been caption and asportation; (4) There must have
been a wrongful taking, in the sense that there was a trespass in the
taking (i.e., the owner must have had possession); and (5) The
requisite mens rea must have been present, i.e., a specific intent
to steal (animus furandi), or deprive the owner of his property per-
manently.46  In addition to the basic larceny statute,47 the 1939
Penal Code contained several other larceny statutes which were
designed to cover certain shortcomings of the common law defini-
tion. For example, one section, "Larceny of bank bills, securi-
ties, and documents, ' ' 48 apparently was designed to protect cer-
tain intangibles, which were not the subject of larceny at com-
mon law.49 This statute and several others were necessitated by
42. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 219 Pa. Super. 18, 22, 280 A.2d 458, 461
(1971).
43. Commonwealth v. Meinhart, 173 Pa. Super. 495, 499, 98 A.2d 392,
394 (1953).
44. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 807, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
45. 50 AM. JUR. Larceny § 9 (1970).
46. Commonwealth v. Meinhart, 173 Pa. Super. 495, 500, 98 A.2d
392, 394 (1953).
47. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 807, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
48. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 808, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
49. But such intangibles were subject to larceny at common law to
the extent of the value of the paper upon which they were written. Jolly
v. United States, 170 U.S. 402, 407 (1898).
modern society to fill voids in the common law property offenses
and accounted for the amorphous quality of the old penal code. 0
(b) Embezzlement
Since embezzlement was not a common law crime,51 Penn-
sylvania had enacted several statutes dealing with this offense. 52
Stated simply, embezzlement was "a fraudulent appropriation of
property by one to whom the property had been entrusted or into
whose hands it had lawfully come. ' '15 On the theme of embez-
zlement Pennsylvania enacted thirteen statutes, each dealing with
a particular relationship of trust, e.g., "Embezzlement by public
officers,"' 4 and "Embezzlement by tax collectors."55  This maze




Fraudulent conversion was also a statutory offense in Penn-
sylvania. 57 Basically, it was "committed where the offender [law-
fully] receive [d] into his possession money or property of another
person and fraudulently withh[eld], convert[ed], or applie[d]
the same to his own use or to the use or benefit of any person
other than the one to whom the money or property belonged."5 "
Fraudulent conversion differs from embezzlement only in that
embezzlement requires a relationship of trust between the owner
50. See also the following former Pennsylvania statutes designed to
supplement the common law larceny offenses: Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375,
§§ 811, 812, 814, 814.1, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973). These statutes
were designed to cover larceny or subject matter attached or affixed to
the land. At common law those offenses would not have been larceny
where the severance and asportation were one continuous act. The fic-
tion is that the subject matter is not personal property until severed.
If the severance and asportation are one continuous act, there can be no
trespass to the owner's possession of personal property. R. PERKINS, PER-
xnis ON CRanNmL LAW 235 (2d ed. 1969). See also Act of June 24, 1939,
No. 375, §§ 813 (Hist. Note), 816 (Hist. Note), [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (re-
pealed 1973).
51. R. PERKINS, PERKINs ON CRIMINAL LAW 286 (2d ed. 1969).
52. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828,
829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 815.1 [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973).
53. United States v. Goldsmith, 274 F. Supp. 494, 495 and n.1 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
54. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 822, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
55. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 823, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
56. See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
57. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 834-35, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (re-
pealed 1973).
58. Commonwealth v. Stahl, 183 Pa. Super. 49, 52, 127 A.2d 786, 787
(1956). The elements of fraudulent conversion essentially include (1)
fraudulent appropriation of (2) property of another (3) which has been
lawfully obtained by the actor.
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and the converter.59 Historically, it was designed to cover those
borderline cases between embezzlement and larceny by a bailee
where a faithless custodian of property (not one of the offenders
enumerated in embezzlement statutes) sometimes escaped punish-
ment on the grounds that his actions were only a breach of trust
for which he was not criminally responsible.60 Therefore, a void
was filled by adding more statutes to the already existing myriad
of theft-type statutes in Pennsylvania.
61
(2) The New Law: Theft by Unlawful Taking
or Disposition62
The greatest changes in the old Pennsylvania "theft" law
are found in Section 3921 of the new code. This section embraces
what was formerly larceny, embezzlement, and fraudulent con-
version, but it is in itself a new concept based on new definitions
and different areas of major concern.
This section is divided into two broad categories: "Movable
property" and "immovable property."' a As is the case with the
other sections in this chapter, this section must be viewed in con-
junction with the pertinent definitions found in the first section of
the chapter, 64 the basic ones centering around the definitions of
"property" and its related areas. It should be noted that these
definitions are equally applicable to the other sections of this
chapter which will be discussed below.
Whereas at common law "property" included only tangible
personal property that had value,65 the new code dramatically
59. SUM. PA. JUR. Criminal Law, Larceny § 244 (1965).
60. Pearl Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Nat'l Ins. Agency, Inc., 151 Pa. Super. 146,
152, 30 A.2d 333, 336 (1943).
61. For example, in fraudulent conversion, it is essential that the con-
verted property belong to the victim. Therefore, if B loans A money,
and A fraudulently decides not to pay the debt, there could be no fraudu-
lent conversion under the old Pennsylvania code since the loaned money
no longer belonged to B. Id. at 155, 30 A.2d at 337. Under the new Crimes
Code there also seems to be nothing to cover this problem, although it is
probably best left to civil actions and the wisdom of the lender.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3921 (Supp. 1973):
(a) Movable property.-A person is guilty of theft if he un-
lawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable
property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.
(b) Immovable property.-A person is guilty of theft if he
unlawfully transfers, or exercises unlawful control over, immovable
property of another or any interest therein with intent to benefit
himself or another not entitled thereto.
63. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973), for definitions.
64. Id.
65. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
changes this to include real estate, 66 tangible and intangible per-
sonal property, contract rights, choses in action, and many things
which were the subject of special statutes to fill the gaps left by
the common law, including electricity and other power. 7 This
expansion of the scope of subject matter underlies the entire the-
ory of the new theft offense. It recognizes that if property, no
matter what kind, is fraudulently appropriated a criminal offense
is committed and that antique fictions should not stand in the
way of prosecution.
Central in the definition of "property" is the concept of
"value" since the code prefaces its reference to specific items
by noting that "anything of value" is subject to theft.68 Value,
of course, is central throughout the theft chapter since it forms
the basis of grading each of the theft offenses.6 9 Therefore, it is
curious that the draftsmen of the code did not include any defini-
tion of the term "value." As a result, the courts will have to revert
to the common law definitions where the situation necessitates it,
although generally the subject matter of the offense and the sur-
rounding circumstances should be able to define its value.70
A basic requirement of the former Pennsylvania "theft" of-
fenses was that the appropriated property belong to another per-
son.7 1 The Code retains this requirement, not only in "theft by
unlawful taking and disposition" but also in all of the definitions
of theft offenses, by explicitly defining "property of another."
71
66. The comments to the Model Penal Code note that mere use of the
land should not be classified as theft, even though it is unauthorized con-
trol with the purpose of permanent appropriation. The rationale is that
the immobility of the real estate makes occupation harmless and the civil
remedies of trespass should suffice. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973):
"Property." Anything of value, including real estate, tangi-
ble and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-
action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or
transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food and
drink, electric or other power.
For special statutes concerning appropriation of electricity, see Act of
June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 860, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973). See also
113 A.L.R. 1282 (1938).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973).
69. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
70. At common law if, for example, a promissory note were stolen, it
was the value of the paper, not the inherent value of the note, which con-
stituted value. Jolly v. United States, 170 U.S. 402, 407 (1898). The new
code remedies this by including intangibles, contract rights, and choses-in-
action as the subject matter of theft. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp.
1973). The old penal code's remedy was to add specific statutes to cover
items not fully protected by the common law definition of value. See, e.g.,
Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 808, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973).
Professor Perkins notes that "any value to the owner is sufficient to satisfy
the requirement" even if the item is one of thirty such items that can be
purchased for a penny." R. PE13Krs ON CIUMINAL LAW 238 (2d ed. 1969).
This appears to be a satisfactory statement of the "value" requirement.
71. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973):
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Utilizing Hohfeldian terminology, the code explains that "prop-
erty of another" is "property in which any person other than the
actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to in-
fringe. '7 3 (emphasis added). Such specificity on a point which
had not been clearly bounded 4 is a major strength of the new
code. Although there may be a fine line in some circumstances
as to what constitutes an "interest," normally the distinction will
be clear. For example, now a co-owner of property can be guilty
of theft of the common property without any conflict with com-
mon law7 5 and without resort to special legislation.76 One impor-
tant exception that the draftsmen add is that where a person has
only a "security interest" in the property, it will not be deemed
property of another.7 7 The commentators of the Model Penal
Code observed that offenders such as mortgagors and conditional
vendees rather than being subject to convictions of theft will be
disciplined by special provisions of the code dealing with misbe-
havior of debtors. 78
Finally in regard to property, the new code uses two indi-
vidual sections to specify types of property which can be the
subject of theft. The first section, 3926, says that the specific
intangible, "services," can now be the subject of theft.79 Early
"Property of another." Includes property in which any person
other than the actor has an interest which the actor is not privi-
leged to infringe, regardless of the fact that the actor also has an
interest in the property and regardless of the fact that the other
person might be precluded from civil recovery because the prop-
erty was used in an unlawful transaction or was subject to forfei-
ture as contraband. Property in possession of the actor shall not
be deemed property of another who has only a security interest
therein, even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a condi-
tional sales contract or other security agreement.
73. Id.
74. See R. PEmKiNs, PEruNs ON CRMnmAL LAW 238-45 (2d ed. 1969).
75. Id. at 244.
76. See Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 835, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (re-
pealed 1973), entitled "Fraudulent conversion of partnership, etc., prop-
erty."
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973).
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954),
entitled "Defrauding Secured Creditors."
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3926 (Supp. 1973):
(a) Acquisition of services-
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains
services which he knows are available only for compensation,
by deception or threat, or by false token or other trick or artifice
to avoid payment for the service.
(2) As used in this section, the word "service" includes, but
is not limited to, labor, professional service, transportation serv-
ice, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services,
entertainment, the supplying of equipment for use, and the
supplying of commodities of a public utility nature such as gas,
proponents of change in Pennsylvania's theft laws greeted this
addition enthusiastically noting that "theft of services is prec-
edent setting,"8 0 and the Model Penal Code commentators added
that this area is new to Anglo-American law.81 Formerly, Penn-
sylvania followed the common law in that services could not
be the subject of theft,82 except where there was statutory au-
thority.8   This has been totally revamped. An individual section
of the code entitled, "Theft of Services," defines the offense
as (1) obtaining services (2) with knowledge that compensation is
necessary and (3) with intent to avoid payment.8 4 Although the
code specifies examples that are within the scope of "service," it
does not limit it to those few specifics. For example, the offense
also includes the use of slugs in pay telephones, subway turnstiles,
and other coin machines providing services (one of the enumerated
means of "taking" is by "false tokens"); but it should be noted
that where such machines provide tangible products, such as ciga-
rettes, "theft by unlawful taking and disposition" is applicable. s 5
This section also provides an explicit presumption for this type of
crime: when a service is normally paid for immediately and the
person absconds, there is a presumption of "theft."8 6
electricity, steam and water, and telephone service.
(3) Where compensation for service is ordinarily paid imme-
diately upon the rendering of such service, as in the case of hotels
and restaurants, refusal to pay or absconding without payment or
offer to pay gives rise to a presumption that the service was ob-
tained by deception as to intention to pay.
(b) Diversion of services-A person is guilty of theft if, having
control over the disposition of services of others to which he is not
entitled, he knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit or
to the benefit of another not entitled thereto.
80. 38 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 120, 136 (1966-67). This article further notes
that "presently [in Pennsylvania] there is a requirement of taking tangi-
ble property. Now one dealing in services-a lawyer, doctor, mechanic,
housepainter, etc.-would be able criminally, as well as civilly, to prosecute
another who secures his services under fraudulent pretenses. His loss can
obviously be as great as the person who has been swindled out of money
or property." Id.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.7, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1954).
82. Id. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3926, Comment 21 (1972).
83. Pennsylvania statutory exceptions are few, including: Act of
June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 871, 871.1, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973),
entitled "Fraud on hotel, boarding house and innkeepers" and "Fraudulent
telephone calls," respectively. See also Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §
872, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973); Act of April 18, 1949, No. 125, §§
1, 2, [1949] Pa. Laws 599 (repealed 1973); Act of April 29, 1874, No. 73,
§ 34, cl.5, [1874] Pa. Law 73 (repealed 1973).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3926 (Supp. 1973).
85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.7, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3921 (Supp. 1973).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3926(a) (3) (Supp. 1973). See Act of
June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 871, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973), for a
similar presumption. Also included in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3926(b)
(Supp. 1973), is a section dealing with "diversion of services." Inclusion of
the term "withhold" as well as "obtain" in that section indicates that theft




The code also provides an individual section for the "theft
of property lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake. '8 T Under the
old statutes it was not clear whether there could be larceny of lost
or mislaid property in Pennsylvania; therefore, reference was
made to the common law."' Under the new law it is clear that
property of another which is "lost, mislaid or delivered under a
mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity
of the recipient" can be the subject of theft.8 9 The key factors
are that the actor must get "control" of the property and have
an intent to "deprive the owner thereof."90  One important point
clarified by this section is illustrated in the situation where A
gives B $5 intending to give him $1, and B later discovers the mis-
take but keeps the $5. Under the new code B would clearly be
guilty of theft.9 1 Finally, it must be noted that a person will be
guilty of theft if "he fails to take reasonable measures to restore
the property to a person entitled to have it," but this omission
must be purposeful, and stupidity or carelessness (negligence)
will not be actionable.
9 2
The division of "theft by unlawful taking or disposition" into
two parts, movable property and immovable property, is necessi-
tated by the basic nature of the offense, since the two types of
property, by definition, can only be appropriated by certain distin-
guishable methods. For instance, immovable property in the
form of accounts in a bank can be the subject of theft where an
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3924 (Supp. 1973):
A person who comes into control of property of another that
he knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake
as to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the
recipient is guilty of theft if, with intent to deprive the owner
thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the prop-
erty to a person entitled to have it.
88. At common law lost or mislaid property could be the subject of
larceny. Commonwealth v. Dearoff, 1 Pa. Dist. 543 (Lebanon 1892).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3924 (Supp. 1973).
90. Id.
91. Common law required a special statute to cover this situation.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. 254, 13 A. 422 (1888).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
It should also be noted that two other sections of the new code deal with
theft of specific types of property and are apparently included because of
the unique quality of the subject matter: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3930,
3931 (Supp. 1973), "Theft of trade secrets" and "Theft of unpublished
dramas and musical compositions," respectively. A formal discussion of
these sections is not included since these areas are essentially unchanged
from the old law. See Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 899.2, 878, [1939]
Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973), "Theft of trade secrets" and "Unpublished
dramas and musical compositions," respectively. See also 17 U.S.C. § 2
(1952), for the policy behind those special sections.
employee of the bank has access to the books and "transfers"
some of the funds in the bank's account to another's account. He
cannot be said to have "taken" the funds but he did "transfer"
them. As a result of this dichotomy, each of the parts of this sec-
tion must be examined separately.
The first part, relating to "movable property," includes all
of the former offenses of larceny, embezzlement, and fraudulent
conversion in respect to tangible property. By special definition,
"movable property" is "property the location of which can be
changed, including things growing on, affixed to, or found in
the land, and documents. '93 This new definition of theft does
away with the "severance and asportation" fiction of the old law 94
and conveys a realistic aspect to the offense of "taking." The
"theft" itself breaks down into three elements: (1) unlawfully
taking or exercising unlawful control (2) over movable property
of another (3) with intent to deprive. Only the third element con-
cerning mens rea and animus furandi provides any problems.
Attempting a clarification, the code defines "deprive"95 as a single
concept embracing both permanent and prolonged withholding
of properly from the rightful owner.9 6 The inclusion of "pro-
longed withholding" is aimed at protecting the inherent "value"
of the property (the seemingly common denominator in the theft
chapter) which may decrease while the property is withheld. This
is a large improvement over the former law which required a
permanent deprivation of the property even where the owner was
deprived of some of the value of this property while it was tem-
porarily withheld.
9?
The section concerning "immovable property" '98 is intended
to cover those offenses against intangible property which was
not the subject of theft at common law or under the old Penn-
sylvania law unless excepted by special statutes.9 9 This offense
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973):
"Movable property." Property the location of which can be
changed, including things growing on, affixed to, or found in land,
and documents although the rights represented thereby have no
physical location.
94. See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973):
"Deprive"-
(1) To withhold property of another permanently or for so
extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its eco-
nomic value, or with intent to restore only upon payment of re-
ward or other compensation; or
(2) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
97. 32 AM. JuR. Larceny § 37 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Wilson,
1 Phila. 80 (Pa. 1850).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973), which says that "im-
movable property" is all property other than "movable property."
99. See note 48 and accompanying text supra. See also Act of June 24,
1939, No. 375, § 808, [1939] -Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973).
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also breaks down into three elements: (1) unlawful transferring
or exercising unlawful control (2) over immovable property of
another or any interest therein (3) with intent to benefit the
actor or another not entitled thereto. As mentioned above,1
00
the major factor which distinguishes this section from the mov-
able property section is that the subject matter, immovable prop-
erty, requires a different type of appropriation, i.e., "transfer" as
opposed to "taking." The most notable element of this section,
though, is the mens rea factor which requires an unlawful in-
tent to benefit the actor or another not entitled to be benefited.10 1
Although nothing is mentioned about an unlawful intent to "de-
prive," this factor is implicit in the language since not only is it an
intent to transfer immovable property, but it is also an intent to
transfer the "benefit" and "deprive" the owner thereof. There-
fore, the definition of "deprive" must also be considered when
utilizing this part of "theft by unlawful taking and disposition."
In addition, this section once again illustrates the emphasis which
the new Crimes Code places on protecting "inherent value."'102
There are also other important changes precipitated by the
new code. For instance, the new code does away with the old
"caption and asportation" ("taking and carrying away") require-
ment of larceny. 10 3 The result appears to be an effort to simplify
by replacing the "caption and asportation" requirement, which
implies a "control" factor, with the new phrases "takes," 'trans-
fers," and "exercises unlawful control."'1 04  The draftsmen of
the Model Penal Code believed that such a change allows the
100. See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
101. The Model Penal Code commentary says that this section makes
certain that fiduciaries may be liable for theft (embezzlement). MODEL
PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). Although this
would also be true in the "movable property" section (the Model Penal
Code Comments note that in the definition of "movable property," "taking"
refers to ordinary theft by a stranger and "exercise" refers to embezzle-
ment. Id.), it is carried a step further here by including the fact that
theft of an "interest" in immovable property is actionable. This does
not only cover most embezzlement situations, it also reemphasizes the
fact that a co-owner can be guilty of "theft" of the common property in
which the other co-owner has any valuable "interest." See note 75 and ac-
companying text supra. In regard to embezzlement, the Model Penal Code
commentators say that this section is in contrast to most existing embezzle-
ment legislation (e.g., Pennsylvania's old law) since there is no effort to
spell out the various relations of trust which can lead to liability. It is
immaterial what relation the thief has to the owner of the property.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
102. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
103. MODE. PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3921 (Supp. 1973).
law to discriminate between attempts and accomplishment at a
"psychologically significant point."'10 5 Professor Hall questions this
rationale since in the new code "taking" is retained and the key
word "control" is left undefined. 10 6 The problem in abandoning
"asportation" in favor of undefined "control", he believes, is in
distinguishing "attempt" and "accomplishment."'
0 7
At many points doubts would arise as to where non-
criminal action ends or where "control" begins, and there
would be no established way to resolve them objectively.
"Asportation" is an extremely precise test to differen-
tiate the attempt from the consummated crime; and al-
though the difference between attempt and a mere prep-
aration is not a precise one, the common law formulas
and case law provide much help in determining that ques-
tion. If both common law "asportation" and "attempt"
are abandoned, and at the same time, in almost every
state attempts must be distinguished from consummated
crimes as well as from noncriminal conduct, how can those
distinctions be made and applied by the use of "control"?
08
One final point which bears mentioning in regard to Section
3921 is its relationship to Section 3927, "theft by failure to make
required disposition of funds received," 10 9 which supplements
the former section by stating that where a person obtains prop-
erty (which can be an "interest in or claim to wealth") and
agrees to make payments out of that property, but intentionally
retains the property to his own use, he is guilty of theft.110 This
situation was not specifically covered by the old Pennsylvania
penal code."' For example, in one case where an employer
agreed to pay his employees' grocery bills by deducting the cost
from their wages and then paying the grocer, it was held that no
action for fraudulent conversion lay when he failed to pay since
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
106. Hall, Theft, Law, and Society, 54 A.B.A.J. 960, 961 (October 1968).
107. Id. at 962.
108. Id.
109. PA. STAT. AiNN. tit. 18, § 3927 (Supp. 1973).
(a) Offense defined.-A person who obtains property upon
agreement, or subject to a known legal obligation, to make speci-
fied payments or other disposition, whether from such property or
its proceeds or from his own property to be reserved in equivalent
amount, is guilty of theft if he intentionally deals with the prop-
erty obtained as his own and fails to make the required payment
or disposition. The foregoing applies notwithstanding that it may
be impossible to identify particular property as belonging to the
victim at the time of the failure of the actor to make the required
payment or disposition.
(b) Presumptions.-An officer or emnloye of the govern-
ment or of a financial institution is presumed:
(1) to know any legal obligation relevant to his criminal
liability under this section; and
(2) to have dealt with the property as his own if he fails
to pay or account upon lawful demand, or if an audit reveals a
shortage or falsification of accounts.
110. Id.
111. But see Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 834-35, [1939] Pa. Laws
872 (repealed 1973), which are similar.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the property did not "belong" to the employees.112 The new
code under Section 3927 would find such an employer guilty and
thus provides a valuable and necessary clarification of a difficult
issue.
B. Theft by Deception
(1) "Cheating by false pretenses" under the old law
The offense of "cheating by false pretenses" was purely stat-
utory under old Pennsylvania law.113 Basically, four elements
constituted the offense: (1) a false representation by the defendant
of a past or existing fact; (2) calculated to deceive and to induce
the person to part with "value" in reliance thereon; (3) which
representation in fact deceived the victim, inducing him to part
with the value to the owner; and (4) which was made with know-
ledge of its truth or falsity with intent to defraud.114 Like the
basic larceny statute, 115 the fraudulent pretenses statute failed
to cover several aspects not included in the basic definition and
supplementary legislation was necessary.11 6 For this reason and
those mentioned below, the offense was reevaluated and redefined.
(2) The new law: Theft by Deception
The new definition of "theft by deception" says that "a
person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or withholds
property of another by deception. 1" 7  Of course, the subject mat-
112. Commonwealth v. Mitchneck, 130 Pa. Super. 433, 198 A. 463
(1938).
113. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 836, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
114. Commonwealth v. Stone, 187 Pa. Super. 236, 144 A.2d 610 (1958).
See also Commonwealth v. Gross, 161 Pa. Super. 613, 56 A.2d 303 (1948).
115. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 807, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
116. See, e.g., Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 837-38, 854, [1939] Pa.
Laws 872 (repealed 1973). There were also many sections of the old code
touching tangentially on the offense of false pretenses, but most of those
are covered in the new code under Chapter 41: "Forgery and Fraud-
ulent Practices." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4101 (Supp. 1973).
117. PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 18, § 3922 (Supp. 1973):
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of theft if he inten-
tionally obtains or withholds property of another by deception.
A person deceives if he intentionally:
(1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including
false impression, as to law, value, intention or other state of
mind; but deception as to a person's intention to perform a
promise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did
not subsequently perform the promise;
(2) prevents another from acquiring information which
ter, "property of another," elicits the same interpretation as it
did in Section 3921.118 In keeping with court interpretations of
the former statutory offense, 119 the code states that "obtains" re-
quires that a "legal interest" in property must be procured. In
addition, the Model Penal Code comments note that "obtains" has
no qualifications as to the manner in which it is accomplished and
therefore indicates that it is no defense that a reasonable person
could not have been deceived. 1 20  The inclusion of the term
"withholds" extends the old law 12 ' and explicitly covers the
situation where the actor already possessed the property when
the false representation was made.
The code states that there are three basic methods of "deceiv-
ing." The first of these methods is by "creating or reinforc-
ing" a false impression as to "law, value, intention or other state
of mind.' 1 22  This change broadens the existing law. For ex-
ample, it now becomes an offense to "reinforce" a false impression
where the false impression already exists in the victim's mind and
the person reinforcing the false impression knows it. 1 23  The major
change, though, is that now not only must a fact be misrepresented,
but also the misrepresentation can be of a law, value, intention
or other state of mind. In fact, "[W]hatever means the actor se-
would affect his judgment of a transaction; or
(3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver
previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows
to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary
or confidential relationship.
(b) Exception.-The term "deceive" does not, however, in-
clude falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance, or
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the
group addressed.
118. See note 72 and accompanying text SUpTa.
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973).
"Obtain".-
(1) To bring about a transfer or purported transfer of legal
interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another; or
(2) in relation to labor or service, to secure performance
thereof.
See also Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 836, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (re-
pealed 1973); Commonwealth v. Stone, 187 Pa. Super. 236, 144 A.2d 610
(1958).
120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
But note that the new code contains an exception, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 3922(b) (Supp. 1973), which states that the term "deceive" does not in-
clude "puffing" by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons or the
group addressed. The Model Penal Code comments say that this is a
compromise between no exemption and an unrestricted exemption for
puffing. It is addressed to the principal concern, misadvertising, where
the message cannot be worded according to the intellectual capacity of
individual readers or hearers, and where it would be unfortunate to create
a pressure for communication in terms suitable to the most stupid. It is
suggested that the Federal Trade Commission can be effective here. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 206.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2,1954).
121. Note that the old law included "obtains" but not "withholds."
Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 836, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3922(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
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lects as the effective ones to deceive will be included.1124  Yet,
although the fiction that "everyone is presumed to know the law"
will no longer protect those who fraudulently misrepresent the
law, a misrepresentation of a "legal opinion" will still not consti-
tute an offense.125 The last part of Section 3922(a) (1) presents
an evidentiary exception to the first method of deception by say-
ing that "deception as to a person's intention to perform a prom-
ise shall not be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subse-
quently perform the promise." 26 Not only does this clause clarify
an evidentiary point, it allays the fear that there will be an
abuse of the new rule that a promise to pay without intent is
criminal, 127 by requiring other evidence to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the actor did not intend to repay the debt.
128
In addition to the "puffing" exception 129 expressed in the
offense of "theft by deception," the code notes that "deceive
does not include falsity as to matters having no pecuniary signi-
ficance.""30 This clause is necessary to cover such non-pecuniary
situations as where a salesman misrepresents his political or lodge
affiliations to effect a sale. Such situations are "too remote" from
the basic concern of the theft section to represent a property in-
terest.13  Also, the new code does not change the law that
"taking advantage of a known mistake which is influencing the
opposite party to a bargain" is not criminal in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances imposing a duty to correct the mistake,' 2 the
rationale being that "the line between what is criminal and what is
not in our society is ill-defined." 3 Finally in "theft by decep-
tion," it must be noted that nothing is mentioned about "fraudu-
lent" or "unlawful" intent to deceive in the new code. Although
such "unlawfulness" can be inferred from the general language of
124. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Stone, 187 Pa. Super. 236, 144 A.2d
610 (1958).
125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3922(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
127. See Hall, Theft, Law, and Society, 54 A.B.A.J. 960, 962 (October
1968). Professor Hall notes with apprehension that careless or optimistic
businessmen may be prosecuted.
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3922 (Supp. 1973), the text of which is
quoted in note 117, supra.
129. See note 120 supra.
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3922(b) (Supp. 1973).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
132. Id. See also note 120 supra.
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.2 Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
The other two methods of deception are rather self-explanatory and are not
discussed in the text but should be recognized since they clarify and make
explicit important areas of the offense. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3922
(a) (2), 3922 (a) (3) (Supp. 1973).
the statute, this unnecessarily leaves a matter open to interpreta-
tion.
C. Theft by Extortion
(1) Blackmail and extortion in the old Pennsylvania law
Under the title "theft by extortion" the new Crimes Code in-
cludes two former Pennsylvania offenses, blackmail 13 4 and ex-
tortion.135 Blackmail, not an indictable offense at common law,
occurs when one person coerces or intimidates another into turn-
ing over valuables to him and the means used are not sufficient to
spell out robbery, i.e., when immediate harm is not present and
consent is given. 136  On the other hand, extortion, as described
in the 1939 Penal Code, is the statutory analogy of what was
common law extortion, containing the same elements as black-
mail except that the intimidation must be exercised by a public
official under color of title or public authority.3 7  At common
law, extortion and blackmail were indistinguishable, 138 and even
under the 1939 statutory differentiation, some Pennsylvania courts
found them difficult to separate.13 9 But the majority of cases
found that the two offenses were different, extortion being a
specific type of blackmail.140 However, procedural problems arose
because of the similarities, e.g., where a defendant was indicted
under the blackmail statute and was found to be guilty of extortion;
some courts found that such a crime failed procedurally.
1 4 1
(2) The new law: "Theft by Extortion"
The new code combines the old offenses of blackmail and
extortion into one offense called "theft by extortion.' 42 Basic-
134. See Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 801-06, [1939] Pa. Laws 872
(repealed 1973). The first section was the general blackmail section and
the other five dealt with specific types of blackmail. The basic elements
of blackmail include (1) intimidation used to acquire (2) property of an-
other (3) with unlawful intentions but (4) with the victim's consent.
135. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 308, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973). The "extortion" statute was not located in the area dealing with
"personal property and fraud" but in the area of "Offenses Against Public
Justice."
136. SUM. PA. JuR. Criminal Law, Larceny § 287 (1965).
137. Id. at § 289. See also Commonwealth v. Costello, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d
535 (Phila. 1958).
138. Commonwealth v. Downer, 159 Pa. Super. 626, 49 A.2d 516 (1946).
139. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Merine, 213 Pa. Super. 88, 245 A.2d 868
(1968).
140. See United States v. Burke, 278 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
141. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 346 Pa. 192, 29 A.2d 793 (1943).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18. § 3923 (Supp. 1973):
(a) Offense defined-A person is guilty of theft if he inten-
tionally obtains or withholds property of another by threatening to:
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit another
criminal offense;
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense;
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to
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ally, this new offense can be described as (1) intentionally
43
(2) obtaining or withholding14 4 (3) property of another 145 (4) by
threats (seven kinds are enumerated).146 The seven threats speci-
fied by the new code broaden the scope of those named under the
old law.147 While including all of those threats specified in the
old law, the new code adds new ones plus a catch-all section which
declares it a crime to threaten to "inflict any other harm which
would not benefit the actor,"'148 and which states the general
principle on which threats are to be included in "intimidation.'
' 49
The scope of the code offense of "theft by extortion" differs
little from the old law with the exception of the addition of several
hatred, contempt or ridicule;
(4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an of-
ficial to take or withhold action;
(5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other
collective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or
received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the
actor purports to act;
(6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony
or information with respect to the legal claim or defense of
another; or
(7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the
actor.
(b) Defenses.-It is a defense to prosecution based on para-
graphs (a) (2), (a) (3) or (a) (4) of this section that the property
obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other invoca-
tion of official action was honestly claimed as restitution or in-
demnification for harm done in the circumstances to which such
accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, or as
compensation for property or law services.
143. "Intent" indicates the mens rea and illustrates an area where
the old case law must be consulted for clarification. In Commonwealth v.
Hopkins, 165 Pa. Super. 561, 69 A.2d 428 (1949), the court said that "if the
defendant intentionally took the money and if it was taken in consideration
of doing or refraining from doing an official act, it is fraudulent." There-
fore, in this section it seems that "intent" implies "fraud."
144. See the discussion of "obtains" and "withholds" in note 121 and
accompanying text supra, which applies equally to "theft by extortion."
145. See the discussion of "property of another" note 72 and accom-
panying text supra.
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923 (Supp. 1973), the text of which is
quoted in note 117 supra.
147. See note 134 supra.
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923(a) (7) (Supp. 1973).
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954),
which gives the example of a professor obtaining property from a student
by threatening to give a failing grade. The Model Penal Code also notes
that a threat need not be express, e.g., a gangster selling "protection," and
it can be implicit in the situation, e.g., where a policeman while effecting
an arrest asks for money and releases the prisoner from custody on re-
ceiving it. Id. Note that this last example illustrates that the threatened
harm need not be "unlawful." Where the policeman is under a duty to
arrest, "unless the arrestee pays him money," is clearly extortionate, al-
though the policeman would be derelict if he did not arrest him. Id.
new threats. For example, the threat can be to injure "anyone,"
an element which also existed under the old law.150 The theory
is that if the threat is in fact the effective means of compelling an-
another to give up property, the character or relationship between
the victim and the person whom he chooses to protect is immate-
rial.1"' Also, in the new code, the former extortion offense is ex-
tended to include situations where one "causes an official to take
or withhold action."'15 2 (emphasis added) Recognizing extortion as
another facet of blackmail avoids the procedural problems that
existed under the old code' 53 and adds a realistic aspect to the
offense.
Finally, two minor problems exist in the new area of "theft
by extortion." As mentioned above, 54 whereas the old law cre-
ated greater penalties for more severe threats, 53 the new law
is graded according to value. It is submitted that this tendency
to ignore the severity of the offense as a consideration in grad-
ing the offenses represents a shortcoming. The second problem
in this section is an evidentiary one arising out of the "threat
to accuse anyone of a criminal offense."'156 Is the fact that the
victim actually committed the crime relevant? The code itself an-
swers this question with an addendum entitled "Defenses,"1 7 which
says basically that if the actor's threats, of the type specified in
three certain subsections 5 8 of "theft by extortion," are based on
an honest "claim of right," such a claim is a defense to prose-
cution under those sections.
D. Receiving Stolen Goods
(1) "Receiving" under the old Pennsylvania law
Although at common law receiving stolen goods was a dis-
tinct substantive offense and a misdemeanor, 159 under the 1939
Penal Code it was essentially a statutory offense, 60 punishable as
150. See, e.g., Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 801, [19391 Pa. Laws 872
(repealed 1973).
151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
152. Id.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923(a) (4) (Supp. 1973). See note 141
supra.
154. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
155. See, e.g., Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, §§ 806, 802, [1939] Pa. Laws
872 (repealed 1973). "Blackmail by threatening to kidnap or damage prop-
erty" (maximum $7000 fine and/or 15 years) and "Blackmail by injury to
reputation or business" (maximum $2000 fine and/or 3 years), respectively.
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923(a) (2) (Supp. 1973).
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3923(b) (Supp. 1973).
158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3923(a) (2), 3923(a) (3), 3923(a) (4)
(Supp. 1973).
159. 76 C.J.S. Receiving § 1 (1952). See also Commonwealth v. Davis,
444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971).
160. Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971).
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a felony in some situations'' and a misdemeanor in others.'6 2 Es-
sentially, the crime of receiving stolen goods was comprised of
three elements: (1) The subject matter must have been previously
stolen; (2) the defendant must have voluntarily accepted posses-
sion of the subject matter; and (3) the defendant must have
received the goods knowing or having reasonable cause to know
the same to be stolen.16'
(2) The new law: Receiving stolen goods
The new code's "receiving" section is composed of two parts.1 04
The first part defines the offense as (1) intentionally receiving,
retaining or disposing of (2) stolen "movable property" of another' 65
(3) "knowing that it has been stolen or believing that it has been
probably stolen." The first element of the offense, "receiving,"
is defined in the second part of this section as "requiring pos-
session, control, or title, or lending on the security of the proper-
ty."' 168 The key phrase is acquiring "control" which means either
in the sense of physical dominion or of legal power to dis-
pose,167 and such control is the essence of the receiving offense. In
addition to "receiving," this "control" factor is implicit in the
terms "retains" and "disposes" which expand the receiving of-
fense under the old law. 68 For example, now if the actor receives
goods and later finds that they are stolen and "retains" them, he
will be guilty of "receiving." The code makes "control" even
more precise by adding that control can be acquired by "lending
161. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 817, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
162. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 879, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973), entitled "Purchase of junk." See also Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375,
§§ 818-20, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973).
163. Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 280 A.2d 119 (1971).
164. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3925 (Supp. 1973):
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of theft if he in-
tentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of an-
other knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has
probably been stolen unless the property is received, retained, or
disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.
(b) Definition.-As used in this section the word "receiving"
means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the se-
curity of the property.
165. See note 93 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the
ramifications of "movable property."
166. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3925(b) (Supp. 1973).
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.8, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
168. The old Pennsylvania code used the term "buys or receives" and
peripherally "disposed." See Act of June 24, 1939, No. 357, §§ 817, 819,
[1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed 1973).
on the security of the property,"11 9 and thus avoids the necessity of
adding more statutes to cover specifics not included in the general
offense. 70 Although the scope of the offense is broadened, the
use of "control" as a definitive element makes "receiving" more
precise than it had been under the old law and thus makes ap-
plication of the section easier.
The property element of the new receiving offense includes
movable property as it is defined by the code,17 ' broadening the
scope of the subject matter and making clear what was vaguely
described under the old code as "any goods, chattels, money or
securities, or any other matter of thing. 17 2 "Movable property"
is used here, and real estate is excluded for the same reason
that it is in "theft by unlawful taking and disposition," i.e., that
civil land remedies are available and adequate.
173
Mens rea is the third element of "receiving," and the old
Pennsylvania law required the actor to "know or have reasonable
cause to know" the goods were stolen. 74 The new code nar-
rows this on one hand by noting that apart from actual know-
ledge, a belief that it was "probably stolen" is necessary; on
the other hand it broadens the old law by requiring a "belief"
rather than a mere suspicion based on cause.' 75 The first draft of
the Model Penal Code used the term "actual awareness," but this
was changed to "belief" in the final draft which Pennsylvania
adopted.1 76 This makes interpretation of this necessarily difficult
element easier by showing that the mens rea must approach
but not reach actual awareness.
Finally in the "receiving" section, the new code offers a
built-in defense. If the defendant has "received, retained, or
disposed of the property with intent to restore it to the owner,"
there is no crime. 77 This is new to Pennsylvania since the
old statutory law had no similar provision. But apparently in the
new code there is no presumption that there was intent to return
the property since there is no mention to that effect by the
draftsmen. Therefore, the defendant bears the burden of show-
ing that he had no intention to "control" the property.
"Receiving" is called 'theft" in the code'7 8 and is, therefore,
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3925 (Supp. 1973).
170. See, e.g., Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 879, [1939] Pa. Laws
872 (repealed 1973).
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3901 (Supp. 1973).
172. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 376, § 817, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973).
173. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
174. See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
175. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3925 (Supp. 1973).
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.8, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
177. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3925(a) (Supp. 1973).
178. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3925 (Supp. 1973).
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part of the consolidated theft offenses. 17 9 The draftsmen saw the
main advantage in such a consolidation as "reducing the opportun-
ity for technical defenses based upon legal distinctions between
the closely related activities of stealing and receiving what is
stolen."18 0 They said:
One who is found in possession of recently stolen goods
may be either the thief or the receiver; but if the prosecu-
tion can prove the requisite thieving state of mind, it makes
little difference whether the jury infers that the defendant
took directly from the owner or acquired from the thief
Consolidation also has a consequence favorable to the
defense by making it impossible to convict [a person] of
two offenses based on the same transaction, as has oc-
casionally happened under existing law, when a man is
held guilty as a principal in the original theft because he
helped plan it and also of the "separate" offense of re-
ceiving because he took his share of the proceeds.""'
An example of multiplicity of verdicts against the offender for
his one act is depicted in one Pennsylvania case' 8 2 where the de-
fendant was convicted of burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen
goods. Under the new code at least the last two offenses would
be considered as the single offense of "theft."'
18
Criticism has been levied against Pennsylvania's type of "re-
ceiving" statute for grading the offense purely according to the
value of the property. 8 4 Professor Hall says:
[T] he traditional approach of treating receivers and thieves
alike and making the gravity of the offense depend on
the value of the property still prevails. The central role
of the receiver in the field of theft is ignored when no
distinction is made between receiver and thief, and basing
the gravity of the offense of receiving on the value of the
property received ignores the fact that a junk dealer who
buys stolen property from the neighborhood boys commits
harm far greater than that designated by the small volume
of the stolen property in the individual transaction. 85
Probably the main reason for not grading "receiving" more harshly
is the same reason expressed above in the "theft by extortion"
179. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1973).
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.8, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
181. Id.
182. Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904 (1967).
183. See R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 322 (2d ed. 1969),
where the author says "the extent of the social menace [of receiving stolen
goods] should not be underestimated." .
184. Hall, Theft, Law, and Society 54 A.B.A.J. 960, 963 (October 1968).
185. Id.
section,186 i.e., to allow the consolidation to operate smoother
without excessive supplementary rules. But it seems that some
minor addition to the receiving section could provide separate
penalties for receiving without divorcing it from the consolida-
tion.
187
E. Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
This is the only section under the theft chapter that is not
denominated as "theft" and, therefore, does not fit into the con-
solidation.18 In other words, the indictment must read "Theft
of the vehicle" or "Unauthorized use," and thus problems of
charging the wrong offense are not avoided in this situation.
Under the old Pennsylvania code there was nothing similar to this
section except for two sections outside of the penal code.8 09 There-
fore, if a person took a "joyride" and there was an intent to re-
turn the automobile, under the old code there would be no lar-
ceny, 90 and the action would have to have been brought outside
of the penal code. 19 1
Under the new code the crime of "Unauthorized use of
automobiles and other vehicles" consists of three elements.
First, the actor must operate the vehicle without intent to deprive
permanently. 192 The only problem here is that "operate" is not
defined. Probably the best test for "operate" is whether the actor
has actual control of the vehicle. For example, the actor who
merely sits in an automobile would not be guilty of the offense;
but once he takes control over the movements of the vehicle,
he would be guilty. The second element is that the subject
matter must be the vehicle of another. 193  This, of course, par-
186. See note 155 and accompanying text supra.
187. See note 31 supra.
188. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1973).
189. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 624(5) (1971):
It shall be unlawful for any person to commit any of the fol-
lowing acts:
(5) To make use of or operate any motor vehicle or
tractor without the knowledge or consent of the owner
or custodian thereof.
See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1475(e) (1963), which is a parallel section
concerning aircraft.
190. Seither v. Pennsylvania Mfg's Ass'n Cas. Ins. Co., 104 Pa. Super.
260, 159 A. 53 (1932). But if the distance is so great that the owner will
unlikely recover the car, the offense is larceny. SUM. PA. JuR. Criminal
Law, Larceny § 252 (1965).
191. See note 189 supra.
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3928 (Supp. 1973):
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the second degree if he operates the automobile, airplane, motor-
cycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of another with-
out consent of the owner.
(b) Defense.-It is a defense to prosecution under this sec-
tion that the actor reasonably believed that the owner would have




allels the definition of "property of another" which should be con-
sulted to clarify any problems with interpreting "vehicle of an-
other."'1 94 The final element of this offense is that the offense
must occur without the consent of the owner, and the code specif-
ically provides that if the defendant operates the vehicle under a
claim of right, there is no offense.'
96
This new offense, which supplements an obvious void in
the old theft offenses, is clearly needed today with the increasing
number and kind of motor propelled vehicles. But the drafts-
men have recognized that the gravity of the offense is not as
great as in the other theft offenses and have graded the offense
accordingly (as a second degree misdemeanor' 98 ) rather than
basing it on the value of the property.
V. CONCLUSION
The new Pennsylvania Crimes Code has transformed the ob-
fuscated maze of offenses against property contained in the '1939
Pennsylvania Penal Code into a comprehensive yet concise body of
expeditious theft laws.197 Those elements and offenses which
were undefined or vaguely defined under the old law have now
been clarified, and those important areas which required special
legislation under the old law are now included under general but
well-defined sections. In addition, these new property offenses
are characterized by a new concept which is embodied in the
term "theft." This new concept of theft is mainly evident in the
consolidation of the various theft-type offenses into a single
offense, 98 thus recognizing the identical character of the basic
theft act no matter how it is accomplished. As a result, courts
and attorneys must view the theft offenses not individually
but as a totality in order to effectively utilize this area of the
new code.
Of course, the new code must be tested by the judicial proc-
ess, and a new body of common law is certain to appear, due
to the few oversights by the draftsmen of the code and predict-
ably penetrating insights and analyses by zealous attorneys. But
judicial interpretations and decisions will be facilitated by the
194. See note 72 supra.
195. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3928(b) (Supp. 1973).
196. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3928(a) (Supp. 1973).
197. The former Pennsylvania offenses covered by Chapter 39 include:
Larceny, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, false pretenses, blackmail,
extortion, receiving stolen goods, and shoplifting.
198. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (Supp. 1973).
tight yet flexible structure of the new consolidated theft of-
fenses. In the final analysis, the redefinition and consolidation of
theft offenses in Pennsylvania's new Crimes Code represents
a major stride forward in organizing and simplifying the chaotic
state of the laws under the 1939 Penal Code and should help to
expedite the administration of the criminal process in Pennsyl-
vania.
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